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STATEMENT " F rjRISDI " 7IGN AND OF NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
"""."- ' •.:••-. -urauanL to 
u C A 7 - - *: a - r • _ • 
The par 11 es to t h i s ac11 on were d i vorced oa t: he 31 s t day o£ 
March, 19 8 7 a r i d i i • :: a j: p e a 1 " v a s 1: a k e i i f i: :: • :i int t: t i » :! :i • ? :: i: :: e d e c r e e . 
1> n M i v 4 t hi
 f i -*d b r ii e H ppe i idii t: b i o u q h t i p e t n u n b e i a r e t h e 
t r i i i c o u r t s e e k i ii q ci;stmiv nt two ot the m i n o r I'hildren, b r a n d y 
^.nd T a k e , -md t o u M ;i i n ' ^ H M I , J 1 ^i I *j 11 I, , !, ' ..J.i,
 t l l u l d 
support 3im '/ i a i r. at i on - The Appella n t u s o s o u q n t t ;i eni or c e 
i id * • * riqjnaJ lecree r e s p e c t i n g payment t *-he 
appellant*! equity MI t he home and wi I In i jspei I I i > i la! j ug 
r e s t r a i n i n q o r d e r s pursuant* to «an order t o show c a u s e tiled at o r 
1 t 11 II I t-» I 1 M 1 1 t »•' . 
The h e s p o n d e n t t i l e d a c o u n t e r pet" i tioni tor c u o t o 1, f I lie 
'ninnr • h i 1 i i K a aev m d 1 o r a s s o c i d t e d r a liei A p p e i I a n * b r o u g h t 
i i »|, pH i i , 'i «i f i l l i i i | n 1 /ed1 ' • an adverse ruling 
oi f. he t. r i a 1 cour t . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . I"i"ea.|".nc111n'1 erii /"in11i 1 1'*-:j 1 e \ \ t - 'iad a the ^isi aay 
of March. 1987 and a copy ut -said aei. i ee 1.3 attached hereto and 
mcorporatnd herein by reference is Exhibit A\ 
2 . A 1 1 1 1 M 1 mi I  in in 1 > 1 1 1 1 '<'• 1 1 U P 1 « 1 » f t p 
r e p r e s e n t e d fa y ri , ' I , L a u r 11 z e n , a t i o i n e y 11 I a u 111 11 d i t u i n e y 
hi a H r e p r <-31 s e n t e d t h e I  < f% H p o n d e n t t h r o u g h o u t "ill p r o c e e d i n g s 
i n c l u d i n g '''his app-enj ' ' ''*.' . ,, , >"" ' " " 1 i* le« 1-j€» ,
 f i " I *i • * 
w a ri n o t i ; e p r e s e n t eci b y c C J U r 1 a.e I in11 f •  nia r; e p r e s e n t e d b y \ esr 1 o 11 a 
counsel throughout the proceedings from which this appeal is 
taken. 
3. After considerable post divorce conflict in which 
neither of the parties accorded much deference the provisions of 
the decree, the parties reconciled and lived together as husband 
and wife with all three children of the parties from October 
31st, 1987 until May 2nd, 1988. 
4. On May 2nd, 1988, without notice to Respondent, the 
Appellant left the home of the parties in California and traveled 
to Utah with the three children of the parties and did not advise 
the Respondent of her whereabouts or of the whereabouts of the 
children. 
5. Through the use of investigators the Respondent was able 
to determine the whereabouts of the Appellant and contemporaneous 
therewith the Appellant filed an order to show cause seeking to 
enforce the existing decree and filed a petition to modify the 
existing decree which actions formed a basis of the instant 
litigation. 
6. In connection with the hearing on Appellants order to 
show cause, the trial court granted temporary relief by restoring 
custody of two of the children to the Respondent and restoring 
custody of the other child to the Appellant as had been provided 
for in the original decree. The trial court further reduced the 
equity payment as required in the original decree to a money 
judgment in favor of the Appellant and against the Respondent. 
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7. The Respondent thereupon brought a counterpetition 
seeking a change m custody of the child then in the custody of 
the Appellant, and requested certain other specified relief in 
the nature of attorney fees and costs expended in connection with 
the Appellants alleged abduction of the minor children, 
8. After several interim hearings during which the trial 
court entered temporary orders restraining the Respondent from 
contacting or harming the Appellant and from withholding 
visitation of the minor children from the Appellant; the trial 
court entered an order requiring that the parties, each of which 
had since remarried, to submit themselves and their present 
spouses to a psychological and environmental evaluation and 
required that all of the parties cooperate in such said 
evaluation including the evaluation of the minor children of the 
parties. 
9. The evaluation recommended that Respondent should have 
custody of all three of the party's children. 
10. After extensive hearings were had, the court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which the court found 
a substantial change of circumstances and the court did in fact 
modify the original judgment and decree from which order the 
Appellant appealed. A copy of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment and decree are attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as by reference as Exhibit MB". 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The bindings of a trial court will not overturned on 
appeal unless the lindings are clearly erroneous. 
2- There was ample evidence to support each of the tindings 
made bv the court in connection with the modification of the 
original judgment and decree, 
3. The judgment and decree as modified, provides a just 
disposition of all of the issues presented at trial. 
4. There was ample evidence to support the trial courts 
finding of a substantial change of circumstances and, in fact, 
the Appellant appears to concur in that ultimate conclusion. 
5. The Appellant, in stipulating to the value of the home 
of the parties in open court and in executing various and sundry 
documents releasing her interest therein, waived any right to 
appeal from the money judgment entered by the court in 
modification of the original judgment and decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN 
CHANGING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD KASEY TO THE RESPONDENT AND 
AWARDED CUSTODY OF ALL THREE MINOR CHILDREN TO RESPONDENT; 
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN UNFIT PARENT WHILE 
RESIDING WITH HER PRESENT HUSBAND. 
Notwithstanding biblical language which is not part of the 
trial record in this case, it is axxomatic that the findings of 
the trial court, unless clearly erroneous and against the 
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manifest weight of the evidence, will not be disturbed- Grayson 
Roper Ltd. vs. Finlinson, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (1939)1. The law 
is also well settled that an inference of correctness attaches to 
the written findings entered by the trial court which inference 
must prevail if supported by competent evidence Saunders vs. 
Sharp, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1991)2. The court found support for 
the award o± custody to the Respondent in the evidence provided 
by each of the expert witnesses, Dr. Gary Sazama, Dr. Elwin 
Nielsen, and Dr. Peggy Poe as well as the other professionals who 
testified at the proceeding generating the rulings appealed from 
here. Each of the experts called was of the opinion that all 
three children should be in the custody of Respondent and should 
reside with him. The court was, no doubt, influenced by the 
desires of the children as well, each of the children having 
expressed the desire to reside with the Respondent. As a 
brooding omnipresence over the entire proceeding we have the 
x
. The applicable standard of review is based on URCP 52(a) 
which provides that Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses 
*. In this case the Utah Supreme Court held that "an 
Appellate court does not lightly disturb .... the findings of 
fact made by a trial court. If a challenge is made to the 
findings, an Appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the 
facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of 
fact. If the Appellant fails to marshall the evidence, the 
Appellate court assumes the record supports the findings of the 
trial court .... (at p.6) 
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present husband of the Appellant. He did not like the children 
and they did not like him and in fact feared him (see finding 
number 12, 17). Appellant does not cite to the record and 
ignores the findings of the trial court in her argument. 
Respondent, not having the burden to marshall evidence to support 
the findings of the trial court, will defer to those 
findings as most expressive of the relationship of Appellant and 
her spouse to the children, Saunders vs. Sharp (supra). The 
court in its judgment and based on the facts as he found them, 
properly awarded custody of all three children to Respondent. 
See also UCA 30-3-10(2) which provides direction to the court. 
POINT II: THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDERS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO VISITATION RIGHTS. 
The court, in its findings of fact numbers 17 through 20, 
made orders of visitation tailored around the singular problems 
created by the presence of Appellants new spouse (see findings 
12, 17 and 18). Though the arrangement was not ideal from 
Appellant's point of view, it was the best the court could do in 
balancing the rights of the parties against what the court 
perceived to be the best interest of the children. At page 6 of 
Dr. Sazamas evaluation, as contained in the addenda filed with 
Appellants brief, the problems confronting the court (as seen by 
Dr. Sazama) are readily apparent. At page 6 the evaluation 
characterizes the Appellants spouse as "demanding, hostile, 
aggressive and sometimes violent...". At page 13 one of the 
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children characterizes the spouse as "dangerous" at page 14 the 
second child is found to have "...fear and resentment..." toward 
the Appellants spouse. The third child at page 15 mentions that 
Appellants spouse "scared her". 
The court, in interviewing the children, (not on the record) 
could not having but sensed attitudes in the children that 
reinforced the expressed concerns contained in the evaluation. 
What else could the court rely on? Appellant has pointed to no 
evidence admitted at trial. On the contrary, her exhibifRR", 
"S" and "T", relied heavily on by her but which would have been 
of little assistance to the court, were not admitted at trial and 
are not found in the trial record. 
POINT III: THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO 
CHILD SUPPORT WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE VIEWED WITH 
REGARD TO EVIDENCE OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Upon this issue, the court found as follows; 
21. As far as the financial arrangements are 
concerned, when the parties moved back 
together in October of 1987, they threw away 
any previous divorce decrees and any 
financial obligations. 
22. The Defendant reshuffled the family 
wealth, she presently has neither the 
capacity nor the ability to make meaningful 
child support payments. After the expected 
child is born of her present union, 
Defendant may go back to work but she will 
probably be unable to make enough to support 
her household and make significant 
contributions to the support of the children 
of the parties but will have resources after 
she receives her home equity. 
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23. The Plaintiff is not entitled to back 
child support in the light of his use, at no 
cost to him, of Defendant's equity in the 
home of the parties. Upon Plaintiff paying 
to the Defendant the stipulated amount of 
£25,000.00 the Plaintiff shall be entitled no 
380.00 per month until the youngest child 
attains the age of 18 years. 
The nominal child support awarded to Respondent <.S80.00 per month 
for all three children) is certainly warranted by the findings 
cited hereinabove. 
POINT IV: IN VIEW OF EVIDENCE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNTS 
FOUND AND APPELLANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE MONEY 
JUDGMENT, THE PARTIES HAVING STIPULATED TO THAT ISSUE. 
The court found, in finding 23 cited at page 7 above, that 
the parties had stipulated to the judgment figure. Appellant does 
not deny her stipulation and an cannot but admit that the 
judgment is now satisfied. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT 
IN CONTEMPT OF PRIOR COURT ORDERS WAS WARRANTED BY ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The only suggestion of contempt not disposed of in earlier 
proceedings is addressed by the court at finding number 28; 
Of the principals, if any party is in 
contempt of court orders heretofore existing, 
it is the stepmother. The court has no 
jurisdiction to make a finding of contempt 
for the stepmothers actions, which the court 
finds to not be attributable to Plaintiff. 
S 
Appellant is unable to point to facts in the record that would 
require a different disposition of the issue. 
POINT VI: THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE HONORABLE JOHN 
WAHLQUIST WAS BIASED AND PREJUDICED WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS OF THE 
PARTIES. 
There is no suggestion on the record that bias, prejudice or 
predisposition of the judge was attendant to these proceedings 
and the disposition of the issues is in no way compelling to that 
conclusion. The statement in Appellants brief that Respondent 
had represented to the court that "his (Respondents) parents had 
gone on a cruise with the judge and that they had everything 
worked out" finds no support in the record nor is there any truth 
in that assertion. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS 
RESPECTING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
The courts findings that Defendant had "reshuffled the 
family wealth" (finding number 22); that "the attorneys fees 
claimed by Defendant (Appellant) are neither justified or 
reasonable" (finding number 20); that "the Plaintiff (Respondent) 
..- does not have the present ability to pay attorneys fees" all 
find considerable support in the record. The ultimate finding 
that "each party should answer to their own costs and their own 
obligations they have incurred to respective counsel..." (finding 
number 22) is manifestly correct and within the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
While this court has before it a case containing an unusual 
and complex factual basis, the disposition of the issue by the 
trial judge was both thoughtful and judicious and finds 
overwhelming support in the record; a record only sparsely cited 
by Appellant and which citation does nothing to support her 
contentions. This court should affirm tijle\ruling of the trial 
j udge-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i 4 ~^L day\ fof A f c n l , 1991 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK THOMAS NIELSON, '. 
Plaintiff, : 
vs . ; 
SHELLY H. NIELSON (MARTIN), : 
Defendant. ' • 3 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) RESPECTING PETITION TO 
> MODIFY DECREE AND 
» COUNTERPETITION 
• Civil No.862025336 
* 
Thia matter came on for healing or the 8th day of June 1989 
a the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the ho iorable John Wahlquiet in 
the courtroom at Logan, Utah and proceeainga were had on the 8th 
and 9th days of June and the hearing waa adjourned and waa 
finally heard to a concluaion on the 22nd day of June and 
witnesses having been aworn and having teatified and the court 
having heard the teatimony and exhibita having been offered and 
received and the court having examined the aame and being fully 
adviaed in the premiaea the co irt now makes and entera the 
following; 
FINDINLS OF FACT 
1. The parties divorced on Kirch 31, 1987; reaumed an extra 
marital relationehip on or aboit Oc.ober 31 1987, finally 
separated on or about May 2nd, 1988. 
EXHIBIT B 
2. Each of the partiea has now remarried and the children 
now reside with Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is married to and 
reaidea with Barbara B. Nielaon and the Defendant is married to 
and reaidea with William K. Marti i. 
3. This court haa appointed an expert and haa reviewed the 
environmental study and haa given du^ weight thereto aa the court 
haa aa to other expert testimony presented. 
4. Brandy Nielaon ia not noticeably retarded and the court 
finda her to be prettier than average, but the court is compelled 
to recognize that although ahe wiJIl prohibly have her romancee, 
will probably marry and have a family > Brandy will have a 
difficult time in obtaining sad-—hoTaing" employment; /it haviTrg-
hnrrn shown to tho courts satisfaction i 4*et— the child has mental 
deficionoioo which probably will pmslst into her adult y e a r s . ^ ^ ^ ? 
5. To allow Brandy to reside with the Defendant while the 
stepfather William K. Martin resides at Defendants home woul^d-
roault ltrrorioua problems in Bre rTdy^ e life. C CUc3^-^ ^^Tv ) 
6. Jacob Nielaon ia at leaf c <^ f average intelligence, brave 
and is self-reliant. Jacob relit a heavily on Plaintiff for love 
and substance and although he is his "daddy^s boy" the close 
relationahip and truat he aharei? ;ith Plaintiff; which ia, in 
aome areaa, not entirely deserved, may deteriorate if Plaintiff 
faila to recognize and deal with Plaintif.'s own shortcomings. 
7. To require Jacob to leave Plaintiff and to reaide with 
Defendant ia inconceivable in view of hia preaent allegiancea>a**d 
2 
in^JLight-of Mrtr-mar^gd~-aiiLlpatrtv^ for the stopf^athea 
8. Kaaey Nielaon appears to be a bright, well adjusted 
child, although torn by her parents obvious and persistent 
conflict. Kasey loves her mother but she does not trust her^, y*^ 
oho trusts her father and relies en her stepmother for her daily 
needs and subsistence. 
9. Kasey re"l±^s, not only on her £^€her and stepmother, but 
upon her siblings for support an^feassurance. Kasey should not 
be separated from her siblings as-^i ; will largely destroy her 
feelings of confidence'and security. ""— 
10. The Plaintiff is a strong willed, hard working man with 
an ingrained self imposed obligation to support his family. The 
Plaintiff hao matured grunt" 1 y r inct> the-div01 cuy~but still has 
some growing up to do. The oh? jrd^en '6f the parties trust him—to 
provide support and he _ia_yr>ri-_r-\y—-of—t^ vat trust having provided 
sjibat-ffntiTaTly all euppoi t since - the~~divorce . 
11. The Defendant is a complex person who is ambivalent 
regarding the outcome of these custody proceedings. She has not 
had a equal chance with the i^hi 1 rlrnn. bnt hftw Inrgply d 1 ffv-Qg-^H^H 
end—ignored hrer Opportunlti se te reconstruct and—advance her_ 
r«1 nt innjLhj_n__ with—the—ehi-ldrex^ fnrem-—their experience—-b*ve-
jch4rJLdien Irave little trust for Defendant although they love her 
as any child would love its mother. 
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12. The stepfather, William K. Nartin, wants to win this 
case, not for concern for the children, bu_ only because he likes 
bo win. He is a selfish, self-centered and violent wan who will 
resort to violence under stress. TT>ft ch.t.dren recognised fcrhestf 
braito and have uu naryard ux xexpect for hi**-and they fear him flft 
13 . Thfli Dftfpnr^rrt in !»n w K 1* t^ r-nrrt-rrrt- hfty present husband 
inrl hnn hann n n n h n r t n nttnrri tho cMlJlrfm mlH'innt n rrptorrt ion ^r 
support in thtti^r—print rnnfrnnfftt 1 rnn with the flt^ptfith*r• 
14. The stepmother, Barbara }. Nielson, occupies an unusual 
>osture in this case, having beccie-q plllai—uf support to—these 
rhildren in their-othex wise uhauLic existence. The children not 
>nly rely on the stepmother for daily care and sustenance, but 
lave developed a strong affection for her. 
15. T&e- etepmother—has,—tO~~ ff" 3aT?e~txtenfc-y—bocomo a mother 
'Ignre t<^~-4-h~ put 1<HH rl\l Mr'wi, a situatici that the court finds 
musual in instances such as this wherj the stepmother has 
hildren in the same age group. ^ 
16. The Stepchildren alsoprt5vide a base of support and 
ecurity for the parties^omiTdi^eji^ which would be largely lost if 
ustody were in aj 
17. Brandy should not be required to visit Defendant, the 
ourt has no practical way of forcing this particular child to 
ensibly visit, she does not vike her stepfather and her 
tepfather does not like her. Shr* may visit her mother at her 
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tternal grandmother's home if Defendant desires but is not 
squired to do so in the presence of the stepfather. 
18. Defendants visitation with Jacob will be set as 
>llows, at his maternal grandmothers home every other weekend, 
he desires, but he shall not be required to visit in the 
eaence of the stepfather and nc ad not stay overnight. Such 
sitation as occurs shall not oc;:ur in a location other than 
>gan, Utah except with his consent, 
19. Visitation with Kasey will be set as follows, every 
her weekend at the maternal grandmother's home at the 
andmothere invitation, said visitation to be with the Defendant 
id her.mother, from 6 p.m. Friday to G p.m Sunday. 
20. No overnight visitation will be required prior to a 60 
y cooling off period from the date of this courts ruling. 
21. As far as the financial arrangements are concerned, 
en the parties moved back together in October of 1987, they 
rew away any previous dlvorce'cfWcrcck^ and arry financial * 
22. The Defendant reshuff .ed the family wealth, she 
esently has neither the capaci ;y nor the ability to make 
aningful child support payments. /.fter the expected child is 
rn of her present union. Defendant may go back to work but she 
11 probably be unable to make enoich to support her household 
d make significant contributions tc the support of the children 
5 
& * - • 
of the parties ^  bire will H«vfi refl^ urgftfi n****^ she recedtVfes ner 
23. The Plaintiff is rot entitled to back child support in 
the light o f his use, at no costs to ^him, of Defendant's equity 
in the home of the partr.es v ^P 0 1 1 Plaintiff paying tp the 
Defendant «*e—st/1 pnl nhed—--tmetmtr-af $25,000.00^ ^ T e Plai-fitif f 
shall be entitled to 080.00 per month until tho—youngest uhlld 
\ c -— 
attaino the age of 16 yaara^ L ^ <• ^ * 
24. In light of his own obligations for child support 
imposed by his prior marriage as well as other pressing debts, it 
is doubtful whether the stapfather will be able to contribute to 
his present household in the foreseeable future and it appears 
that Defendant,for all practical purposes, will be the principal 
provider for herself and the expected child. 
25. The court finds ro psychosis in any of the principals 
whether they be the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the stepfather, the 
stepmother, or the children t f the parties and in this regard 
does not find that the couit ordered evaluation is supported by 
the evidence. The court does subscribe to the findings in the 
environmental study regarding present placement of the children. 
26. The court finds thai the defendant is not entitled to 
attorneys fees and finds that the attorneys fees claimed by 
Defendant are neither justified nor reasonable. The Plaintiff, 
in light of the circumstances now appearing, does not have the 
present ability to pay attorneys £GBB incurred by Defendant in 
6 
this action although Plaintiff's claimed attorneys fees are more 
in line with those justified by the nature and complexity of this 
proceeding. 
27. Each party should answer to their own costs and to 
their own obligations they have incurred to respective counsel 
without contribution from the opposing ~-irty. The Defendant is h 
not entitled to costs for travel nor :"or lost wages claimed.^^ 
However if in fact there was & court appointed expert per se the 
28. Of the principals, if any party is in contempt oT ccftirt 
orders heretofore existing, it is the stepmother. The court has 
no jurisdiction to make a finding of contempt for the stepmothers 
actions, which the court finds to not be attributable to 
Plaintiff. 
29. It is unlikely that Defendant will exercise visitation 
set hereby and will probably disappear ads she has done at times 
previous. 
30. There has been no kidnap^ ~ng p*Mved in this action, any 
act attributable to Plaintiff was, at best, merely a Sunday 
afternoon interference ^  jund—-was tnrzfgTy justified by the 
31. The myriad of recorded conversation between the 
parties, alone or involving the present spouses of the parties, 
have little weight or substance as evidence in this hearing and 
amount to nothing but pure trickery practiced on the Plaintiff by 
Defendant and her present spouse killlaw K. Martin. 
32. The attorneys becax€ personally involved in the 
conflict between the parties; counsel for the Plaintiff was able 
to extricate himself from this unseemly behavior at an early 
stage while counsel for the Defendant never has. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and 
enters the following; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is a £iv. and proper person for the care 
custody and control of each o t le three minor children of the 
parties; Brandy Nielson, Kirk J icob Nielson and Kasey Nielson 
subject only to reasonable visitation ir the Defendant and should 
be awarded custody of Kasey NieUci. 
2. All other prior ^jstod/ orders should remain 
undisturbed^ the—Plaintiff should t4*e*N;by enjoy custody- of all 
3. The D^f^ndant, while residir g^iiith her present spouse, 
William K. Martin, is r*ot a fit pep^on for the care, custody and 
control of the minor childre>><6randy Nielson, Kirk Jacob Nielson, 
and Kasey Nielson and/visita .ioft\must take into account the 
undesirability of ^exposure of the chilcfr^ to the stepfather 
William K. Martin. 
4. While Defendant reside { with William K. Martin and until 
further order of this cou$/t,\De::endant should enjoy limited 
visitation not to exceed t*ie follbfing; 
8 \ 
Brandy should not be required to visit Defendant 
unless governed by her own desires. Erandy may visit her mother 
in her maternal grandmothers home without interference by 
Plaintiff but not in the presence of the stepfather. 
b. Visitation with J \cob should be set as follows, at 
his maternal grandmothers ho ie every other weekend, if he 
desires, but should not be req illsd to visit in the presence of 
the stepfather and need not stay overnight. 
c. Visitation with Kaney should be set as follows, 
every other weekend at the maternal grandmothers home at her 
invitation and with the Defendant and/<? her mother, from 6 p.m. 
Friday to 6 p.m. Sunday. 
5. Plaintiff should provide a 1 support for each of the 
minor children of the parties until the amount of 025,000.00 is 
paid by the Plaintiff to Defendant; the Defendant presently 
having neither the ability nor resources to contribute 
significant support to the children of the parties. 
S. The Defendant, through her actions, has largely 
dissipated the wealth of the pertes^ rend<M?Hir«g 1L impossible for 
Plaintiff to r-^feririre LJiu judymt nL 'in favor—of the Defendant now 
encumfeeir±Trg-^ tlTe lands jointly owr."ed by~ttie—pai Lies wliiuh is now" 
pcgupled_by P1*H nt-.J-f-f mnd th** r-h< IHr^n nf Uve parfcicrBr: TTve" 
Plaintiff can, however, borrow £oney gn r)f*for\Anr>tf\ equity i#-
tranfiffirred to hi* and he siuuld do SO"witnin 3U days and pay to" 
^Defendant $25,000.00 upaft-=^gg§BEB i l b ^ a t g j j T g J ^ ^ 
7. Upon transfer and payment as set forth in paragraph 6 
above, Defendant shall, for <ach month thereafter pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of seo.OO/ger^^Tilld aupporE said payment to—-
p e r s i s t u n t i l frhft yrmng*>« + p L t l A * + *• m i n »X* * g * of IQ y g a r s Qi'^bfl 
jotharwi-serngmonclpated. 
8. Plaintiff, by his actions, has forgone the right to 
recover from Defendant any loss or expanse incurred as a result 
of the separation* reconciliation and ultimate violent severing 
of the family bonds which have pre< ipitated the hearing on the 
petition and counterpetition now before the court. 
9. There should be no contempt adjudged against any party. 
10. Each party should pay the attorneys £e&& and costs 
necessarily incurred by them .n prosecution of this action 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
DJSTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
John Walsh, attorney 
for Defendant 
nielson 12/07 
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assume that the legislature intended a fair resuU 
Reversed. 
WE CONCUR: -
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
, I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice * . » 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in' 
the result. 
1. The current version of the statute reflects mr.or 
grammatical changes made in 1986. 
2. Section 70A-1-104 provides: "This act be a. a 
general act intended as a unified coverage >f its 
subject matter, no part of it shall be deemed «. be 
impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if Such 
construction can reasonably be avoided. * 
Cite as 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRAYSON ROPER LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP and Grayson Roper, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Rich FINLINSON, Jos. T. Finlinson, n c , a 
corporation, Gordon Nielson, and Jor I Doe1 
I, -' * " ;. ' '•* ' 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 860171 
FILED: October 17,1989 f 
Fourth District, Millard County 
Honorable George E. Ballif \ , l% . 
ATTORNEYS: 
Fred W. Finlinson, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants'
 v 
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for appellees 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
• , publication in the Pacific R porter, i 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendants Rich Finlinson, JQS. T. Finlinson, 
Inc., a corporation,» Gordon Nielson, and John 
Doc 1 (hereinafter i collectively referred to as 
"Finlinson") appeal from a trial court decision that 
quiets title of a strip of land in plaintiffs Grayson 
Roper Limited Partnership and Grayson Roper 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Roper"). 
Finlinson claims the court erred in ruling that 
Roper's quiet title action was not barr i by sect-
ions 78-12-5 and-6 of the Code ant in refu-
sing to find that Finlinson had gained tie to the 
disputed land through boundary by ac uiescence. 
The trial court decision is affirmed. 
Roper and Finlinson are adjacent Ian own rs in 
Millard County, Utah. Roper is the re >rd wner 
of an eighty-acre parcel described as the south 1/ 
2 of the southwest 1/4 of section 34, township 15 
south, range 4 west, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
(SLBM). Roper acquired this property in 1971 and 
can trace a clear chain Qf title back to the patentee 
who acquired the land from the federal govern-
ment in 1916. The land owned by Finlinson perti-
nent to this action is a forty-acre parcel immed* 
iately to the east of Roper's property. Finlinson 
acqured this parcel in 1963. It is described as the 
southwest 1/4 of the southeast 1/4 of section 
34, nwnship 15 south, range 4 west, SLBM. Fin-
linsor, can trace a clear chain of title back to the 
pater *ee who acquired the land from the federal 
gov JO ment. The dispute between Roper and Fin-
lins. concerns a strip of land approximately 129 
feet 'ide, lying within the bounds of Roper's 
prope .y but on its eastern boundary. It is descr-
ibed as the east 129.4 feet of the south 1/2 of the 
southwest 1/4 of section 34, township 15 south, 
tnge4west,SLBM, ^ 
For many years, a road extended the length of 
>ie 129-foot-wide strip, in a north/south dire-
ction and provided access from the town of Lea-
mington to what is now known as Utah Highway 
No. 125. Roper and his predecessors in interest 
used this road and allowed others to do the same. 
For many years, a fence stood along the west side 
of the strip. In 1979,' Finlinson plowed out the 
road and began farming the strip of land. Roper 
asked Finlinson to cease this activity, but Finlinson 
refused. In May of 1982, the Bureau of Land 
Management ("the BLM") resurveyed the southern 
boundary line of section 34, as well as other bou-
ndaries in the area. The BLM then placed a survey 
marker to establish the. southeast corner of the 
southwest 1/4 of section 34. This survey marker 
was located 129.4 feet to the east of the old fence 
next to the now-plowed-up road. In September 
of 1982, Roper erected a partial fence, on, Xhe 
• sect on boundary « as established by the -newly 
pla<ed BLM marker. Finlinson removed the fence, 
informed Roper that he owned the land, and 
wa^ied him to « keep off the property or face
 t a 
transaction.
 Ui j n . ^ t . 
(*- May of 1983, Roper filed a,quiet title action 
:a£& ist Finlinson, requesting injunctive ,relief and 
dam ges. Finlinson defended by, contending that 
Rop r's suit was barred by the statute Qf limitat-
ions in the Utah Code that pertains,.to actions 
involving title to real property. See Utah, Code 
Ann. §§78-12-5,-6 (1987)./ The ,sections 
relied on, 78-12-5 and -6,
 r state ^  as a precond-
ition to the bringing of an action concerning title 
to real property that the plaintiff, counterdftimant, 
or its predecessor in interest must have been, in 
possession of the .property within seven, years 
before the commencement of the action.1 The 
plaintiff or counterclaimant need not prove actual 
possession to satisfy ."this requirement.- .Under 
•section 78-12-7 of the Code, ,a i party holding 
legal title to the property is presumed to. be "in 
possession" within the meaning of sections 78-12-
5 and-6. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 (1987).2 
However, section 78-12-7 also provides that this 
presumption can be rebutted if it is shown, that 
"the property has been held and possessed adver-
sely to such legal title for seven years before the 
Grayson Roper I ^lited Pi^nership v. Finlinson CODB«CO 
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commencement of the action." Id. 
* The trial court heard conflicting evideice and 
ruled in favor of Roper. It found, inter aha, that 
(i) Roper was the record title owner of n-e disp-
uted strip of land; (ii) both Roper and Finlinson 
regularly used the road on the disputed strip and 
both more recently claimed exclusive possession of 
the land; (iii) the boundaries of Roper's property 
were established by three United States survey 
teams, as well as two Millard County surveyors; 
(iv) the BLM survey or* 1982 confirmed the boun-
daries of Roper's property^ and (v) Roper had 
paid taxes on the contested strip of land for twelve 
years and his predecessors in interest had done the 
same for over fifty years. The court then held, that 
Finlinson had not established the adverse posses-
sion claim necessary to rebut the presumption 
raised -by* section 78-12-7! in favor of Roper and 
;that the statute of limitations defense asserted by 
Finlinson failed' because Roper was' "seized or 
possessed of the property, in question within s ven 
yearsibefore the commencement of the action.' Id. 
It thereforel> quieted title in Roper. Finli son 
appeals. WW-' 
'^ Before ? addressing Finlinson's arguments on 
appeal, we note the applicable standards 11 review. 
A trial court's legal conclusions are ace >rded no 
particular deference; we review them for correct-
ness. City of West Jordan v. Utah StaL: letire-
ment Bd.t 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 198fc^ Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
On the other hand; a trial court's findings of fact 
are given deferential review. Utah Rule ->f Civil 
Procedure 52(a) provides, "Findings cf fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary e/idence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witne-
sses." Utah R. Civ. P.' 52(a). To successfully 
attack a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of 
'the findings and then demonstrate that the evid-
ence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
J
 therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack under the rule 52(a) standard. Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
'885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Finlinson does not dispute that Roper is the 
record title owner of the section which includes the 
disputed strip of land and that that fact raisfd a 
presumption of possession in Roper under se Mon 
78-12-7. However, Finlinson contends that the 
trial court erred in Finding that the statutory ?re-
sumptton had not been rebutted. In support of this 
claim, Finlinson asserts that the trial court made a 
finding that he or his predecessors in int rest occ-
upied the strip for over fifty years orior to 
Roper's bringing the quiet title action. Ms, he 
claims, is sufficient to show that "the pro ;e iy has 
been held and possessed adversely to sujh legal 
title' for seven years before the commencement of 
the action." Utah Code*Ann. § 78-12-7 (1987). 
The factual premise on which Finlinsoi bases 
this argument is contrary to the trial court's 
finding that both Roper and Finlinson used the 
strip of land over the years before claiming the 
right to exclusive possession. Finlinson has not 
tMnpted to carry his burden of marshaling the 
.vii ence in support of the trial, court's finding 
egarcjing mutual use of the strip and then demo-
istranng that that finding is clearly erroneous. See, 
e.g., kartell, 116 P.2d at 886. Therefore, there is 
no re? .on for us to disturb that finding. SecAshton v. 
f\sht n, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
Bu' even if Finlinson or his predecessors in int-
rest lad exclusively possessed the disputed strip 
ior i ore than seven years before Roper brought 
his s t, that fact would not operate to rebut the 
presu iption of possession accorded Roper by 
sectii i 78-12-7. Relying on sections 78-12-9 
and-1 of the Code,3 Finlinson contends that it 
is en< jgh to "possess adversely" under section 78-
12-7 if one merely cultivates crops on the land. 
This reading of the Code is plainly erroneous. 
Sections 78-12-9 and-11 only define when 
"land is deemed to have been possessed and occ-
upied" by a party' seeking to * establish adverse 
possession. They specify that cultivation of crops 
suffices for possession or occupation. But that 
alone is not enough to establish a claim of adverse 
possession. Payment of "taxes is also required. 
Section 78 12-12 provides: ^ \ , *|U« . 
In no case shall adverse possession 
be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, 
unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the 
period of seven years continuously,* and 
that the party, his predecessors . and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have 
\)een levied and assessed upon such 
ind according to la w. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1987) (emphasis 
added >. This payment-of-taxes requirement has 
•seen ong recognized. See, e.g., Smith v. Nelson, 
14 U'ah 51, 56-57, 197 P.2d 132, 135 (1948); Home 
Owner's Loan Corp. [xv. Dudley, 105 Utah 
208, 20-21, 141 P.2d 160,166-67 (1943); Huntsman 
v. untsmant 56 U t a h 6 0 9 , 6 1 9 - 2 0 , 
192 F 368,372(1920), . . , - * , . 
Wt read the words "possess adversely" in 
sectic i 78-12-7 as having the same meaning as 
"adverse possession" in section 78-12-12, 
thereby importing into section 78-12-7 a requi-
rement that all of the elements of adverse posses-
sion be shown to rebut the presumption of posse-
ssion it raises in a record title owner. To hold 
otherwise, as Finlinson requests, would be to 
permit a party to use section 75-12-7 to estab-
lish de facto an entitlement to property by adverse 
possession without showing the payment of taxes 
This result would be flatly contrary to the plain 
intent of he legislature as set out in section 78-12-
12 and confirmed in our cases. See Fairer v. 
Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 193-94, 271 P.2d 462, 
» i-66 (1954); Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 
3 , 136, 138 P. 1169, 1171 (1914). Finlinson's 
>c<;ition also contradicts fundamental principles of 
tatutory construction: to wit, separate parts of an 
rict should not be construed in isolation from the 
est of the act, Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), and the 
terms of related code provisions should be const-
rued in a harmonious fashion, see Utah State 
UTAH ADVANCE RbPORTS 
TOVO. Uian 
„.--~,...... i ; Limited 
____ 119Ute'.. 
Road Common v. Fribcrg, 687 P.24 821, ft-1 
(Utah 1984). Because Finlinson has not shown that 
he had paid taxes on the pro >erty for seven years, 
•the trial court correctly ruleu that sections 78-12-
5 and-6 did not bar Roper's suit. 
• We next address Finlinson*s argument tha the 
trial court erred in failing to find that he acq ired 
title to the disputed strip of land. through the 
doctrine .of; boundary by acquiescence. Finlihson 
recognizes that, the, presence of clear title in Roper 
and the ready availability of accurate survey inf-
ormation showing the true status of the strip of 
land would require affirmance of Roper's title 
under oiir decision in Halladay v Cluff, 685 P.2d 
500 (Utah 1984). Under Halladi /, there must tx 
•objective uncertainty" as to a boundary's loca-
tion before boundary by acquif cence. can come 
into play. 685 P.2d at 505-06. Finlinson argues 
that we should limit Halladay tc an "urban scen-
urio,* When the. land is rural, 1 inlin on suggests, 
we should adhere to the traditii aal boundary by 
acquiescence rule of Fuoco v. % Wiafcs, 18 Utah 
2d-282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). nder Fuoco, the 
four prerequisites of boundary b acquiescence are 
(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual ace 
uiescence in the line as the bound in , (iii) for i 
long period of years, (iv) by adjoining landowner . 
Id. at 284,421 P,2d at 946. 
Even if we were to so limit Halh d< y, Finlinsr . 
would, not, prevail here because he i nnot sat* I 
all the elements of Fuoco. The trial court. foiiii 
that the fence along the west side of the disputec 
strip wds built for stock c mtrol and not as a 
boundary; therefore, it was lot acquiesced in as a 
boundary by both parties. Finlinson has not atte-
mpted to carry his burden of overturning that 
finding on appeal. • See Bartcll, 116 P.2d at 886. 
Wc • there fore . deciin e to o vert u. r n th e t rial c* . u it * s 
finding on that point 
The trial court's decision quieting title in Ropei 
is affirmed.. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Richard C. Davidson, Utah Co, n of Appeals 
Judge 
Howe, Associate Chief Jus* xe, ) wing 
disqualified liimself, does not par cipa herein; 
Davidson, Court of Appeals Judp , sat» 
Partnership v. Finlinson 
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1 Section 78-12-5 provides: 
No 'action for';, the recovery of real 
property or for. the possession thereo f 
shall be maintained, unless it appears 
that the plaintiff, his ancestcr, grantor 
or predecessor was seized or j ossessed 
of the property in question wth n seven 
years ' before the ' commencem« of thc 
action," 
Utah ••Code "Ann §78 12 5 '-(1987) Section 7fc 
.12-6 provides: 
No .cause .of action or defense oi 
counterclaim to an action, founde" 
upon the title to... real property or t 
rents or profits out of the same, shall be 
effectual, unless it appears that the 
person prosecuting the action, or inter-
posing the defense or counterclaim, or 
under whose title the action is prosec-
uted or defense or counterclaim is made, 
or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor 
of such person was seized or possessed 
of the property in question within seven 
years before the committing of the act in 
respect to which action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim made. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-6 (1987). 
2. Section 78-12-7 provides: 
In every action for the recovery of 
real property, or the possession thereof, 
the person establishing a legal title to the 
property shall be presumed to have been 
possessed thereof within the time requ-
ired by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be 
deemed to have been under and in sub-
ordination to the legal title, unless it 
appears that the. property has been held 
and possessed adversely to; such legal •, 
title for seven years before the commev 
ncement of the action, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 (1987);V 
3. Section 78-12-9 provides: ; 
For the purpose f of constituting : an~ 
adverse possession by s any person clai-f 
ming a title founded upon a* written^ 
instrument or judgment or decree,; land J 
is deemed to have.been possessed and 
occupied in the following cases: 
(1) where it has been, usually'iOU.lt.iv-, 
a ted or improved. 
(2)-where'it has been - protected by: a '; 
substantial inclosure, 
(3) where, although not inclosed, it 
has been used for the supply of fuel, or 
of fencing timber, for the purpose of 
husbandry, or for pasturage or for the 
ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) where a known farm or single lot 
has been partly improved, the portion of 
such farm or lot that may have been left 
not cleared or not inclosed according to 
the usual course and custom of the 
adjoining county is deemed to have been 
occupied for the same length of time as 
the part improved and cultivated. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9 (1.987), - Section 78-
12-11 provides: 
p o r tj i e purpose of constituting an, 
adverse possession by any person clai-
ming title not founded upon a written 
instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and 
occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) where it has been protected by a < 
substantial inclosure 
(2) 'where it has., been usually cultiv 
ated or improved. 
(3),where .labor.or money1 has been 
expended upon dams; canals, embank-
ments, aqueducts or otherwise for the 
purpose of irrigating such lands amou 
nting to the sum of $5 per acre 
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IN T H E S U P R E M E COURT 
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H 
I eon I I. SAUNDERS; Robert Felton; 
Saunders Land Investment Corp., a Utah 
corporation; White Pine Ranches, a UtaL 
general partnership; White Pine Enterprises, a 
Utah general partnership; and Kenneth h 
Norton, dba Interstate Rentals, IF:: :; ^ vad 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Peti(ioners, 
v. 
John C. SHARP and Geraldine Y, Sharp, 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 900360 
FILED: February 12, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
ATTORNEYS: 
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake Cit>, > 
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, «m.' 
Saunders Land Investment Corp. 
Glen D. Watkins, Bruce Wycoff, Salt i_a. 
City, for White Pine Ranches and Whit 
Pine Enterprises John B. Anderson, Sai 
Lake City, for Kenneth R Nort -\ ' 
Interstate Rentals 
Donald I v\mde:. kathv A 1 1 ) J \ I . , .\.; • 
L a k e C r *-••• • l- . • <erahJM.' 
Sharp 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Apj ais 
This opinion is subject to revision bed *e 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on plai tiffs' 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 
decision of the court of appeals in Saunders v 
Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 19S0) 
The petition is granted. Further briefing by .hi 
parties and oral argument are deemed unn : 
essary, as the arguments in the petition bri'f, 
are adequate for our determination. T . 
matter is remanded to the court of appeals fo" 
modification of its opinion in accordance with 
this opinion. 
Plaintiffs purchased approximately sixty 
acres of unimproved real property from def-
endants under a contract which consisted of 
several separate memoranda to be interpreted 
together. Both parties agree that the property 
was to be developed and resold in residential 
lots consisting of four or five acres, as a 
planned.unit development ("PUD"). Defend-
ants, as sellers, agreed to release and convey 
*harp 
ep. 5 
one PUD lot upon receipt of each $140,000 
paid in principal. Initially, plaintiffs platted 
only half the property. On December 23, 1983, 
the plat of phase I of the project was recorded 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Six five-acre lots and a private internal 
roadway were described on the plat. Defend-
ants executed a deed to lots 1 through 5, as 
requested by plaintiffs, pursuant to the release 
clause of the contract. 
Plaintiffs breached the contract by making 
only a partial payment on the real property 
taxes in November 1984. In addition, they 
were able to pay only a portion of the 1985 
annual payment. Nevertheless, they state that 
they previously paid sufficient principal to 
cover 'he purchase price of the platted lot 6, 
all of the internal roadway of phase I, and 
7.35 a.:res of the unplatted acreage. Plaintiffs 
claim that under the release clause of the 
contra t, they are entitled to the release of all 
prop rt/ paid for, in spite of their prior 
bread. By their complaint, plaintiffs sought 
convey* ice of these areas by specific perfor-
mance <f the contract. Defendants countei cl-
aimed for foreclosure. 
'
The trial court found that the contract 
rec lired plaintiffs to designate the property to 
be conveyed pursuant to the release clause, 
anc plaintiffs had never requested conveyance 
of any property except the first five platted 
lots. In its statements of applicable law, the 
trial court stated that plaintiffs' breaches were 
material, significant, and continuing and were 
uncured when plaintiffs requested release of 
the roadway, lot 6, and the additional 7.35 
acres from the unplatted property. Accordi-
ngly, the trial court denied specific perform-
ance and granted judgment to defendants. 
Plaintiffs appealed, and the matter was poured-
over to the Utah Court of Appeals for review. 
On appeal, plaintiffs reiterated their claim 
that they are entitled, under the contract, to 
conveyance of all property paid for, in spite of 
their breach of the contract by nonpayment of 
the entire purchase price. The court of appeals 
interpreted the argument as a challenge to the 
findings of fact made by the trial court. In its 
opinio , the court of appeals made this stat-
ement: 
?'• >:c b i n ers have not marshaled the 
</v fence in support of those find-
ing, but merely argue that there is 
evic snee contradicting them, they 
have failed to demonstrate that the 
findings are against the clear weight 
of the evidence. We must therefore 
accept the findings as valid and 
a (firm the judgm en t. 
793 P.2d at 931 (emphasis added). 
As far as its review of plaintiffs' challenges 
to the findings of fact is concerned, the court 
of appeals was correct. An appellate court 
does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jurv 
u 154 Utah Adv. Rq 5 Provo, Utah 
nor the findings of fact made by a trial court. 
If a challenge is made to the findings, an 
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial court and 
then demonstrate that even viewing the evid-
ence in a light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings of fact. If the appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the 
case. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v, LMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
However, the court of appeals erred when it 
then automatically affirmed the judgment 
based on plaintiffs' failure to show ne find-
ings of fact to be unsupported. An apellate 
court is to review the trial court's COP > isions 
of law for correctness. Landes v. Cap i A City 
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990;t Once 
the findings of fact (rather than the jucgment) 
were affirmed by the appeals court, it was 
then incumbent on that court to review the 
trial court's conclusions of law and its appli-
cation of the law to the facts as found. The 
interpretation of a contract is a matter of law 
for the court to determine unless the contract 
is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' 
intent (which is a matter of fact) is necessary 
to establish the terms of the contract. The 
court of appeals failed to analyze the law 
applicable to the case, and the case is there-
fore remanded to the Utah Court of Appeals 
for that purpose. 
So ordered. 
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Defendant K e i t h Reed (h e r e i n a f t e i 
defendant") appeals the trial court's order 
nd judgment denying a motion to quash 
servi » of summons upon him and the default 
judg lent entered against him. 
PI intiff and defendant were granted a 
divor :e on April 15, 1987, in the Fourth 
Judic al District Court, Utah County. Under 
the terms of the divorce, plaintiff was awarded 
items of personal property, including a travel 
trailer and a four-wheel-drive pickup truck, 
neither of which was surrendered to plaintiff 
in a timely manner. The trailer was eventually 
returned to plaintiff by defendant's parents, 
Merrill Reed and Georga Reed, also named 
defendants in this matter. 
On Mav 8, 1988, in an effort to recover the 
pickup v. uck, plaintiff caused the sheriff to 
serve the subject summons upon defendant 
and his parents at his parents' home in Orem, 
Utah, where defendant had resided during the 
jc.dency of the divorce. At the time of 
5 *r/ice, the sheriff was informed by the 
raients that defendant no longer lived at the 
residence and that they did not know where he 
vas but thought he was out of the state. The 
sheriff nevertheless left defendant's copy of 
the summons at the parents' home and com 
pletec a return of service. 
On May 25, 1988, defendant appeared spe-
cially and filed a motion to quash service. He 
, eluded with the motion affidavits from 
himsc'f and his parents stating that he did not 
live v.ith his parents and that the service m 
proce.s was not made at his -^-; »i •-•*•*•• ••-• 
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(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate 1988 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, pr /iieges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both rarents , 
where specified; 
(2) may include an awaru •»! cwciu.-.w .nihil-
ity by the court !< , m- pan-m ; . nuiKi- ptv v 
decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custod. of the 
child except as specified in the order of jo *it legal 
custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly 
equal periods of physical custody of and access to 
the child to each of the parents, as the best int. r-
est of the child often requires that a prime *y 
physical residence for the child be des igmt .d ; 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specif y\ ^g 
one parent as the primary caretaker and ;<\e 
home as the primary residence of the child. 1988 
30-3-10.2. Jo in t leuni ru.s toJ\ ord**i - l-actor* 
for court tu i> > nji-uiti.-. «'i,Ui« as-
sistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it 
determines that joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal 
custody; or 
tb) both parents appear capable of implement-
ing joint legal custody. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a 
child will be served by ordering joint custc iy, the 
court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychologic 1, and 
emotional needs and development of th • child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give fir? . prior-
ity to the welfare of the child and reach shar d 
decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encour-
aging and accepting a positive relation.' lip be-
tween the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated n rais-
ing the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of 
the parents; 
(0 the preference of the child if the child 's ol 
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to o: m 
an intelligent preference as to joint legal cus' ^ y; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their v;.Ji-
ingness and ability to protect the child from con-
flict that may arise between the parents; and 
(h) any other factors the court finus relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best intc rest of the 
child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an or-
der for joint custody may preclude eligibility for pub-
lic assistance in the form of aid to families with de-
pendent children, and that if public assistance is re-
quired for the support of children of the parties at any 
time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the 
order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the 
parties attemm to sett.lp fntnrp Hisnnfpc hv n ^iennto 
p solution method before seeking enforeemuLi . . 
modification of the terms and conditions of the order 
of joint legal custody through litigation, except in 
emergency situations requiring ex. part** '^de^ t 
protect the child. *»** 
30-3-10.3. 1 e rms of" jo int legal custoti> .#»viw 
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide 
terms the court determines appropriate, which may 
include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, 
until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child; 
ib) that the parents shall exchange informa-
tion concerning the health, education, and wel-
fare of the child, and where possible, confer be-
fore making decisions concerning any of these 
areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regard-
i ig the child's present and future physical care, 
s lpport, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the 
c 'Id's attendance at school and other activities, 
nij daily routine, and his association with 
i ends; and 
e) as necessary the remaining parental rights, 
pr vileges, duties, and powers to be exercised by 
thv parents solely, concurrently, or jointly, 
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the 
o der the terms agreed to between the parties. 
3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed 
b the court order may be exercised by the parent 
in'ving physical custody of the child the majority of 
the time. 
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians 
does not impair or limit the authority of the court 
to order support of the child, including payments 
by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is 
not grounds for modifying a support order. 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolu-
tion procedure the parties agree to use before seeking 
enforcement or modification of the terms and condi-
tions of the order of joint legal custody through litiga-
tion, except in emergency situations requiring ex 
parte orders to protect the child, ia^s 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an 
order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or 
b >th custodians have materially and substan-
tially changed since the entry of the order to be 
\i> dified, or the order has become unworkable or 
i lppropriate under existing circumstances; and 
b) a modification of the terms and conditions 
of he decree would be an improvement for and m 
th best interest of the child. 
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be termi-
ni ted by order of the court if both parents file a mo-
ti n for termination. At the time of entry of an order 
te minating joint legal custody, the court shall enter 
aii. order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. 
All related issues, including visitation and child sup-
port, shall also be determined and ordered by the 
court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this sec-
tion is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner 
J75 JUDICIAL CODE 78-3-4 
(d) carry out duti.es prescribed by the Suprenv 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(51 Filing fees for the Court of Appeals an ili-
as for the Supreme Court. :--
^»2a-3. Cour t of Appea l s ju r i sd ic t ion . 
. til The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to i*su< 
ill extraordinary writs and to issue al' writs ami pi; 
mm necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, ordei.-
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
l2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
tftduding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission. Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review o 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies < f 
political subdivisions of the state or other h 
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency actioii und< 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a ci -
wi t court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving ;\ 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in crimin«H 
cases, except those involving a conviction . 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first d gree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving do-
mestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater-
nity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
[3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
pttdby the vote of four judges of the court may certif 
iji the Supreme Court for original appellate revie -
MHhi determination any matter over which the Com 
M Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
|^ (4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the i 
ifitrcments of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review t 
ig»ncv adjudicative proceedings. it)! 
'-'RMa-4. Review of ac t ions by S u p r e m e Cour , 
k Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of tl ; 
(mul of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of cert.-
i to the Supreme Court. IBFI 
:H»2a-5. Locat ion of Cour t of A p p e a l s . 
n The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Alii Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
«rr of its functions in any location within the state. 
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Section 
* .'»-1 {'• '/.-.;• J. repealed. 
~ '> •'- l e r m of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y . 
•- -•; jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cii -
cuit court — Appeals. 
Repealed. 
7^ 3 o. .'errns — Minimum, of once quarterly. 
7.-3-7 tu 78-r - l l . Repealed. 
- "i-1 i "• State District Court Administrative Sys-
tem — Primary and secondary county 
locations. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.~. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Proce-
dure — Facilities —- Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of d is tnc: court fees and 
fine. 
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed 
78-3-16.5. Fees for filing and other seivices or a* 
tions. 
78-3-17. Repealed 
78-3-17.5. Application ot s;i-. mL*> . ; . J - U . : I . !• - ... 
ties. 
', -3-18. Judicial Admmi •• »M:; - I -\. ; St . n : 
tie 
78-3-P1 Purpose of act 
7-- -3 -lii! Definitions. 
i6-3-21 Judicial Council — Creation — Mern 
bers — Terms and election — Respon-
sibilities — Reports. 
7 3-3-22. Presiding officei — Compensation -
Duties. 
^3-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appoint-
ment — Qualifications — Salary. 
"3-3-24. Jourt administrator — Powers, duties, 
and responsibilities 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provuii m:. rmai'.c;: an<: st,-
tistical dai.i ;• ;u:m:mst:Mi-i . - tr. 
courts 
78-3-27. Annual judicial . unierence. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term — 
Compensation — Powers — Duties. 
78-3-30 Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications 
— Appointment — Functions gov 
erned by rule. 
78-3-1 to 7«-3 .. 1971, 1981, 1968 
78-3-3. l e r m of judges* — V a c a n c y . 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
i illy until the first general election held more than 
' iree years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January, next following the date of 
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
a o pointed a i d q u a 1 i f I e d, 1988 
'. 8-3-4. Ju r i sd i c t ion 
c it cour t -
T r a n s i e r oi euM-> t* 
R u l e 52. F ind ings by the cour t . 
(a) Effect. In all actions cried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advi; ory jury, the court snail 
find the facts specially and -tate separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, an- judgment ?" all be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A :n grantin ; nr refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the ^ourt shall r nilarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions ot law which 
constitute the grounds of its pction. Reqr*es s for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of ?eview. Find-
ings of fact, whether based »>n oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to UIQ opp< rtunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of ne wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to th* ext> nt that 
the court adopts them, shall be considers i as Jie find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if t. e fn lings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of .he evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41<D). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) A m e n d m e n t . Upon motion, of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry o r judgment the court 
may amend its findings or makt additional findings 
and may amend the judgment a cordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are madt in 
actions tried by the court wi hout a jury, the quesy ion 
of the sufficiency of the evi( *nce to support the find-
ings may thereafter be ra* icj whether or not the 
party raising the question l.-\ made ir *ie district 
court an objection to such fir cKigs or ha.c n ade either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for ju I rment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of f indings of fact and conc lus ions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, fir dnigs of fact 
and conclusions of law may l>e waived b / the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed H th» cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open cour , en >red in 
the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan.. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 53. Mas te r s . 
(a) A p p o i n t m e n t a n d compensa t ion . Ar> r or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by tl 3 court 
to a master upon the written consent of the pa. ties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parties or paid out of any fund or ubject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct. T .e master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation; hut 
when the party ordered to j ly the compensation al-
lowed by the court does no pay it after notice and 
within the time prescribed b; the court, the master is 
entitled to a writ of executior eainst thy1 -delinquent 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the i m § 
are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jiajjj 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in tfcf 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be ma l l 
only upon a showing that some exceptional conditim 
requires it. ; 
(c) P o w e r s . The order of reference to the majUf 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him I t 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perfom 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence oojy 
and may fix the time and place for beginning an! 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the masttdl 
report. Subject to the specifications and limitation* 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exerdflfc 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every he*** 
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mtmi 
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor* 
mance of his duties under the order. He may requift 
the production before him of evidence upon all mas-
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc* 
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, aa i 
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon tb# 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed bjr 
the order of reference and has the authority to po! 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine the» 
and may call the parties to the action and examinf 
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the ma* 
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered an! 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the sam* 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidenof 
for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) P roceed ings . 
(1) Meet ings. When a reference is made, tht 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwiw 
provides, the master shall forthwith set a tin** 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days afler 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of th* 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring tht 
master to speed the proceedings and to make hb 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and! 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex part* 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to f 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure thf 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witnesa 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) S ta tement of accoun t s . When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master, he 
may prescribe, the form in which the account* 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may 
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of tht 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
nished, or the accounts or specific items thereof 
)unt-
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R Utah-? more particularly, describes as: 
¥^%$\ •/. ...Lot' 7, Blk 4, HILL CREST HEIGHTS SUBD, se 
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:
.?*!; ;\ shown by the officii J plat thereof as filed 3 
^ L 1 ^
 t> April 1962 as filing No. . 4129 in the office 
pK of the Recorder of Cache Ctunty, Utah 
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JV*1<4»"-- ... • * 
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:p088tssion of the home of the parties up to the 15th day of 
k '' • • 
^September, 1987 at which time Defendant is to surrender 
poiflffseion of the home ;o the Plaintiff and Plaintiff to buy 
Defendants' haljf of the equ It*" in the home at appraised value as £of$April 1st, 1987. 
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imake^all mortgage payments Bnd PJaintiff will do all<necessary 
hqme >repairs. Defendant's not to commit waste on the premises 
* ^ ' ^ °
 p a y a i l
 utility payments. Jpon the of receipt;of payment 
for^Defendant's equity in , the h >me at whatever time* payment be 
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^ I ^ j b e i a n d i s ^ ordered , that the Plaintiff pay., to the 
Ujgg00tifmun'otS**™ for her interest in the 1983 Baja boat, 
^^Pbe^ore !ethe ;lBV ; ldayj cf Apr: 1, 1987. 
f # 'I t 'be 'and i s heieby "or^red that the savings /account b^e 
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§ £ $ • • $ > • . . ' • y- • v • . • • • • . ; i ' 
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M'njjjftfljjje'tfr Ihis'ofiicf.. 
VeNOY CHRISTOPFERSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
